Permissible = tolerable
Jovan Babic, Philosophy Department, University of Belgrade, 2000 (Justifying Forgiveness”, Peace Review, Vol. 12, no. 1)
Consequently, unlike religion, ideology, politics, business and other spheres of everyday life, morality does not allow for the possibility of tolerance. Tolerance is the demarcation line between that which is permissible from that which is impermissible. In practice, what is morally permissible is what is in a way morally indifferent, and it is the subject of legitimate freedom, while what is morally impermissible can absolutely not be tolerated and its tolerance (by others) would mean abandoning the basic principle of moral evaluation (in oneself). Tolerance is possible only when I tolerate something with which I disagree, something that is unpleasant, odious and repulsive to me (otherwise, there is no need to speak of tolerance at all). It is morally possible only if it means doing something without degrading or undermining one's own moral integrity. This can only happen outside morality, in the area of legitimate freedom. Although freedom is a precondition of morality (making the attributions of responsibility possible), there is no freedom (or the possibility of different evaluation) in the area of morality. When tolerance goes beyond the line between permissible and impermissible and enters the domain of the unacceptable supererogation, we no longer have supererogation at all, but instead the morally wrong. It is not possible, for example, to tolerate lies and it makes no sense to say that tolerance implies that the person who lies has the right to expect of others to assent to the information content of his statements. For that reason the right to lie cannot exist. A similar conclusion may be drawn in the case of forgiving when it implies complicity in something that cannot be tolerated. The right to forgiveness does not exist in such cases. When does it then exist?